DANE HARREL, et al	. ,		
	Plaintiffs,		
V .		   Case No. 23-cv-141-SPM	
KWAME RAOUL, et al	Defendants.		
FEDERAL FIREARMS LICENSEES OF ILLINOIS, et al.,			
V.	Plaintiffs,	Case No. 23-cv-215-SPM	
JAY ROBERT "JB" PR	ITZKER, et al., Defendants.		
CALEB BARNETT, et	al.,		
	Plaintiffs,		
<b>V</b> .		   Case No. 23-cv-209-SPM	
KWAME RAOUL, et al	., Defendants.		
JEREMY LANGLEY, et	al.,		
	Plaintiffs,		
V .		   Case No. 23-cv-192-SPM	
BRENDAN KELLY, et	al., Defendants.		
Tı	ranscript of Status January 12, 2		
the	roceedings held by e Honorable <b>STEPHEN</b> ed States District	I P. McGLYNN,	
REPORTED BY:			
HANNAH JAGLER. RMR	, CRR, FCRR, Offic	ial Court Reporter, Illinois 62201	

APPEARANCES: (Case No. 23-cv-209-SPM)

For Barnett MATTHEW ROWEN

Plaintiffs: Clement & Murphy, PLLC

706 Duke Street

Alexandria, VA 22314

202-742-8900

Matthew.rowen@clementmurphy.com

**GARY C. PINTER** 

Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLP

103 West Vandalia Street, Suite 215

Edwardsville, IL 62025

618-655-3131

Gpinter@smbtrials.com

For Harrel DAVID G. SIGALE

Plaintiffs: Law Firm of David G. Sigale, P.C.

430 West Roosevelt Road Wheaton, Illinois 60187

630-452-4547

Dsigale@sigalelaw.com

For Langley THOMAS G. MAAG

Plaintiffs: Maag Law Firm, LLC 22 West Lorena Avenue

Wood River, Illinois 62095

618-216-5291

Tmaag@maaglaw.com

CARL D. MICHEL

Michel & Associates, P.C.

180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200

Long Beach, California 90802

562-216-4444

Cmichel@michellawyers.com

For FFL Illinois Plaintiffs:

SEAN ANTHONY BRADY

Michel & Associates, P.C.

180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200

Long Beach, CA 90802

562-216-4464

Sbrady@michellawyers.com

For FFL Illinois Plaintiffs:

CARL D. MICHEL

Michel & Associates, P.C.

180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200

Long Beach, CA 90802

562-216-4444

Cmichel@michellawyers.com

KONSTADINOS T. MOROS

Michel & Associates, P.C.

180 East Ocean Boulevard, Suite 200

Long Beach, CA 90802

562-216-4444

Kmoros@michellawyers.com

For Defendants Raoul, Kelly, and Pritzker:

CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM WELLS

Illinois Attorney General's Office

Public Interest Division 100 West Randolph Street Chicago, Illinois 60601

312-814-1134

Christopher.wells@ilag.gov

KATHRYN HUNT MUSE

Illinois Attorney General's Office 100 W. Randolph Street, 12th Floor

Chicago, Illinois 60601

312-814-3000

Kathryn.Muse@ilag.gov

For Randolph Co. Defendants:

KATHERINE FAY ASFOUR

Evans & Dixon, LLC

211 N. Broadway, Suite 2500

St. Louis, MO 63102

314-552-4005

Kasfour@evans-dixon.com

For McHenry Co. Defendants: TROY OWENS

McHenry County State's Attorney's Office

2200 North Seminary Avenue, Suite 150

Woodstock, Illinois 60098

815-334-4159

Tcowens@mchenrycountyil.gov

For Defendant Cole Shaner:

KEITH B. HILL

Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, PC

105 West Vandalia Street,

Mark Twain Plaza III, Suite 100 Edwardsville, Illinois 62025

618-656-4646

Khill@heylroyster.com

## TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

(Proceedings commenced at 1:32 p.m.)

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois is now in session, the Honorable Stephen McGlynn presiding. Court calls Case Number 23-cv-209, Caleb Barnett et al., v. Kwame Raoul, et al. Case is called for a status conference.

Parties, if you would please identify yourselves for the record.

MR. ROWEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is Matthew Rowen from Clement & Murphy on behalf of the Barnett plaintiffs.

MR. MICHEL: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Chuck Michel appearing for the FFL Illinois plaintiffs. And with me today is Sean Brady and Kostas Moros.

MR. SIGALE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. David Sigale, S-i-g-a-l-e, on behalf of the plaintiffs in Harrel v. Raoul, 23-cv-141.

MR. T. MAAG: Thomas Maag on behalf of the Langley plaintiffs.

MR. P. MAAG: Peter Maag. Peter Maag on behalf of the Langley plaintiffs as well.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. OWENS: Your Honor, Troy Owens on behalf of McHenry County and the sheriff of McHenry County.

MR. PINTER: Gary Pinter on behalf of the Barnett 1 plaintiffs. 2 Keith Hill on behalf of Cole Shaner. 3 MR. HILL: MR. WELLS: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 4 Christopher Wells on behalf of the governor, the attorney 5 6 general, and ISP Director Kelly. 7 THE COURT: All right. 8 MS. MUSE: Good afternoon. Kathryn Muse on 9 behalf of the same parties as Mr. Wells. 10 THE COURT: All right. Anybody else? 11 MS. ASFOUR: Katherine Asfour on -- Your Honor, 12 Katherine Asfour on behalf of the Randolph County defendants. THE COURT: Anybody else? Everybody I see on my 13 screen has already identified themselves. I'm told that there 14 are some who do not have their camera on, but are participating 15 just by watching it one direction. Somebody else just joined 16 Is that you, Peter? I'm squinting my eyes. 17 us? MR. P. MAAG: It is, Your Honor. 18 19 THE COURT: Okay. All right. We're going to --20 I want to set this matter to determine if there's going to be a need for evidentiary hearings, to accomplish a fully developed 21 22 record, starting with Barnett. Do you anticipate calling witnesses or offering deposition testimony? 23 So this is Matthew Rowen for the 24 MR. ROWEN: 25 Barnett plaintiffs, Your Honor. So I want to answer that in two

ways. So the first way is, if we are to operate under the Seventh Circuit's opinion, then yes, I do believe that we will want to have a relatively robust evidentiary presentation.

THE COURT: I'm having a hard time hearing you, so you guys are going to have to speak loudly and clearly. The voices are getting kind of lost in this courtroom. So I would also speak a little slower than you were. So go ahead.

MR. ROWEN: Sure. Please let me know if you cannot hear me at all.

THE COURT: I can hear you fine now. Thank you.

MR. ROWEN: Great.

So as I was saying, if we are to proceed under the Seventh Circuit's opinion as it currently stands, then I do believe that the plaintiff, specifically the Barnett plaintiffs will want to put on a relatively robust evidentiary presentation. But, you know, I speak for the Barnett plaintiffs and I believe I have at least two of the other plaintiffs' groups who agree with this, that given that the Supreme Court may have a different view of the law and given that our clock to seek cert is ticking, that it may make more sense to pause any potential evidentiary presentation pending certiorari.

THE COURT: Not going to happen. It's not going to happen. We're going forward. There are questions of fact that are raised. And the Supreme Court's going to do what it's going to do. In this case, we are going to conduct a hearing

and I'm going to address all the questions of fact and apply the law to those questions of fact so that we have a fully developed record, and we are going to move with deliberate speed in getting to that point. So you're going to have to think about what evidence you want to marshal, how you're going to present it, what witnesses you're going to use, and how long that's likely to take. All right?

MR. WELLS: Your Honor, I'd just like to make clear for the record that the defendants are in agreement with Mr. Rowen and three of the four plaintiffs' groups that a stay is appropriate. It's the parties' job to present the case as they see fit. If they think they need to seek cert and that the governing standard in the case is going to change, then that's the best strategy for their clients, then they're entitled to pursue that strategy. And it's a waste of resources for the Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing if the plaintiffs think the legal standard is going to change.

I would note that in the Northern District, one Court this morning already entered it today. So the Seventh Circuit has consolidated these cases on appeal. The idea that we would have one case out of several race forward while the other cases are stayed, I don't think that's going to be well received by the Seventh Circuit, Your Honor. So while I understand if the Court has an interest in moving quickly, I think the -- it's ultimately up to the parties how they believe

it's appropriate to prosecute their claims.

THE COURT: The Seventh Circuit has remanded this case to me for further proceedings.

MR. T. MAAG: I agree with Your Honor. The Langley plaintiffs are prepared to proceed. The fact that the Supreme Court may or may not grant certiorari I think is irrelevant to whether or not this Court develops a factual record and makes factual findings.

MR. WELLS: My understanding from my conversation with Mr. Rowen is, and based on how at least three out of the four of the plaintiffs in this case have presented it, they believe that they -- they should win out of the gate. They filed motions for judgment essentially when they filed their complaint. They believe I think that the Seventh Circuit's got it wrong and that these factual issues that the Seventh Circuit has identified are ultimately not going to be relevant, so why would we spend resources of both the parties, the Court, the attorneys involved, on issues that at least, you know, a large majority of the people involved in this case, they think are not going to be controlling.

And obviously if the Seventh Circuit as it's ruled, if that ruling stays in effect, then it's a different scenario. But I think we are very much in alignment with the Barnett plaintiffs, what I understand the Harrel plaintiffs' position to be, and also the FFL plaintiffs' position. In

conducting an evidentiary hearing on the merits on an accelerated timeline when the legal standard is currently being adjudicated through cert petition is a waste.

THE COURT: This case is not -- this case is not up on cert. There have been multiple filings with the Supreme Court begging them to grant certiorari in this and in many other cases, and they've consistently turned that down. One of the things the Courts have said that they wanted is they would like a fully developed record. This has been remanded to me to address questions of fact that have not been addressed, and there's a reticence on the part of reviewing Courts to rule on these things before there has been a fully developed record. So we're going to proceed in developing record and we're going to proceed promptly.

What other plaintiffs' lawyers want to be heard on that?

MR. T. MAAG: Judge, Thomas Maag. Just for the record, I agree with Your Honor that we should proceed on the merits on the record that the -- as the Court noted, several other plaintiffs in other cases have asked the Supreme Court for review. Thus far, it has not been granted. Obviously if the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari, my position might change. But unless and until we have a writ of certiorari granted, I think we have an obligation to proceed on the merits.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MICHEL: Your Honor, Chuck Michel for the FFL Illinois plaintiffs. I would just add just for clarity, what the plaintiffs' intention was was to file a petition for a writ of certiorari within the next couple of weeks. The other case -- the other Supreme Court decisions were basically shadow docket decisions where they asked for emergency relief, not cert petition granting, to the extent it matters. Just want to make sure that's clear.

THE COURT: I've been following it closely.

We're here to talk about a hearing, marshaling of your evidence, putting everything before the Court that you want to put before the Court for the Court to make factual findings to address the issues raised by the plaintiffs in this case. All of the plaintiffs have asserted that fundamental constitutional rights are involved in this case and that they individually or as a group, that they are suffering significant damage and injury because their constitutional rights are being violated. So we're going to get to that.

We went the route with requests for injunctive relief. That took a year, about a year. And now we're here, having the injunctive relief, in my situation, stayed, and the case being sent back to the district judges to proceed further. That's what I'm going to do. If something happens in the interim, okay. But until then, that's what's going to happen in this courtroom. Other judges in other districts can make the

decisions they want to make. A lot of the record that would be developed here would be perfectly relevant to the other cases, but this is what we're going to do. So --

MR. WELLS: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes?

MR. WELLS: If I may?

THE COURT: Identify yourself when you speak.

When you speak, you have to identify yourself.

MR. WELLS: Sure. Your Honor, this is Mr. Wells. Again, I understand the Court's view on how the parties chose to litigate this case and their desire to pursue this matter on an interlocutory appeal. But that's the parties' decision, Your Honor. The parties are represented by capable counsel. I understand they make certain assertions about fundamental rights and the Court apparently has a view that those fundamental rights are being infringed, but it's up to plaintiffs' counsel to decide how to litigate the case. Plaintiffs' counsel believes that they should stay the proceedings while certiorari is considered because the scope of the case may change.

And in the interest of judicial economy, we again think it makes sense, and frankly it's consistent with what the Seventh Circuit has said. And in particular, in the Ewing v. Carrier case, Judge Easterbrook in 2022 said the judiciary has an interest independent of litigants' goals in avoiding messy, duplicative litigation. All litigants and lawyers must avoid

multiplying litigation. By pursuing this, we've got a stay in the Northern District. There's likely to be another stay in the Northern District, as we understand the plaintiffs there also seek certiorari, plaintiffs also seek a stay. All of this is fundamentally inconsistent with how the Seventh Circuit has handled this particular case and how the Seventh Circuit views these matters should be handled in the interest of judicial economy. So with all due respect, I need to make that note for the record.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. T. MAAG: Thomas Maag for the Langley plaintiffs. We do not believe that the case should be stayed. So to the event counsel is asserting all plaintiffs assert that, that is not true.

MR. WELLS: I'm not asserting that. I understand Mr. Maag's position is different than every other group of plaintiffs' counsel in the state.

MR. SIGALE: Your Honor, may I speak?

THE COURT: Identify yourself for the record.

MR. SIGALE: David Sigale, S-i-g-a-l-e, on behalf of the Harrel plaintiffs. All the counsel that have said that our position is the same as FFL and Barnett is correct. We do share in that opinion. We'll of course comply with what the --with the Court ruling. The concern is, I'm listening to everyone speak, is that we're going to be preparing a cert

petition and preparing for an evidentiary hearing at the same time. Might I suggest that --

THE COURT: How many times have you guys briefed this case? How many times have you argued this case, in how many courts? You guys have briefed this case -- wait. All of you guys. You have briefed this case in state courts, appellate courts, and before the Illinois Supreme Court. You briefed this case and argued this case at the District Court level and at the Seventh Circuit level.

MR. SIGALE: Understood, Your Honor. The only thing --

THE COURT: And I've read the briefs and they're very detailed and they -- they're very well written. But this Court --

MR. SIGALE: I was --

THE COURT: Someone's trying to interrupt me.

Raise your hand. Who's trying to interrupt me?

MR. MICHEL: When you're finished, Your Honor, I'd love to speak. I didn't mean to interrupt.

THE COURT: Well, go ahead, Chuck.

MR. MICHEL: I would just point out, if we're going to go forward, the briefs that we've done in the past were basically the Bruen textual historical analog briefs. It seems like under the Seventh Circuit's briefs or new sort of approach, we're going to have to do a lot of different things. I don't

know exactly what that's going to involve, some kind of distinction between military applications and civilian applications, factual questions about whether or not an AR-15 is the same as an M16 or something along those lines, then all the other guns. I think it's going to be a lot of expert testimony, a lot of technical, firearm-related technical information that would not be necessary if we -- if the Seventh Circuit had adopted the approach that we urge them to adopt.

But now, bound by the Seventh Circuit as we all are, I think it's going to be a very different type of trial if the Court does want to go forward. It might make sense to allow the parties to sort of meet and confer and come up with some sort of a case management plan or case presentation, like a trial notebook or something, that would sort of lay out how we -- what we -- what the state thinks the burden is now under the Seventh Circuit, what we propose to present as evidence to try and meet that burden. Not to tell Court how to run its own calendar, but I think it's going to be a bit of a can of worms that we have to hopefully help the Court manage.

MR. WELLS: Your Honor, if I may -- Mr. Wells on behalf of the state -- just respond to that proposal. I think that that -- the extent that the Court is going to proceed, despite the requests that have been made for a stay, I do think there's some streamlining that could take place through conversations with the parties. We have not had a Rule 26F

discovery conference in this case. We don't have Rule 26(a) disclosures in this case. There's been no discovery on the Second Amendment claims that are common across all these claims, across these cases. So I do think in the interest of expediting and not being duplicative, the parties could have very constructive conversations about all that's already in the record now, what do we need to add to the record or not add to the record, or do we want to do a trial on the papers. All of these are the types of questions that I think we could have constructive conversations about, if we're in the position where the Court's insisting that we're going forward.

MR. SIGALE: Your Honor, David Sigale again. I was going to suggest that perhaps we could set this matter for a further status regarding the cert petitions and regarding the factual issues. And I think that request probably dovetails nicely with what other counsel just said.

MR. T. MAAG: Thomas Maag for the Langley plaintiffs. I have a motion requesting to either conduct discovery or have the Rule 26 discovery conference. I think discovery is appropriate. And whether a cert petition is filed, I think it's highly likely it will be, and whether a cert petition is ultimately granted, which is potentially another question, I think it's a completely different question than whether or not the parties are ordered to exchange initial disclosures, to send interrogatories and document requests and

potentially take depositions. This doesn't require years of discovery, but certainly something if we're going to have an evidentiary hearing, which is clear under the Seventh Circuit's order, if it stands, we're going to, we need to conduct that discovery.

Yes, we've repeatedly briefed this under various standards, but we need to have the facts so that when the case is presented, whether it's under the Bruen standard, under the Seventh Circuit standard, or possibly if the Supreme Court issues an opinion, Ravini [phonetic], whatever that case is, under that standard, if it's any different, we need to -- I'll present whatever facts, the controlling authority, the appellate or Supreme Court level thinks is appropriate. We just need to get to that.

THE COURT: Mr. Wells, what type of discovery do you believe that the government needs to engage in to figure out whether or not the legislation it passed is constitutionally sound or unsound?

MR. WELLS: Well, Your Honor, I would say a couple things to that. One, as the record currently stands, the Seventh Circuit found that we're likely to succeed on the merits. We're the defendants. So it's really -- we're in a responsive posture here. We understand from plaintiffs' counsel that they -- they have strategic choices they have to make about how they're going to shape their case, given what the Seventh

Circuit has said, which I think is clearly different than what they thought it might say. So that's why I -- I'm not trying to be evasive. We really need to know who they plan to call.

So for instance, they cite things like a survey from Professor William English. We don't know if that's going to be one of their witnesses. If so, we'd like to depose him. Professor Gary Kleck, somebody else they cite various articles from in their complaint. Is that a party expert witness, is that somebody they're going to call as a witness? If so, we'd like to depose him. There's another Professor David Kopel. We don't know whether that's going to be an expert witness that they're going to call. We have no -- again, we have no Rule 26(a) disclosures from the plaintiffs telling us who they're going to use to prove their case. Obviously before any evidentiary hearing, we'd want to depose those folks to know what they're going to say. So in terms of --

THE COURT: And you know what, all that stuff is going to happen. That's why we're having this get-together.

You guys are now going to think about how you are going to present this case for a hearing on the merits, one.

Two, how we are going to fully develop the record so that when there is a final determination, the Courts can look at the various firearms, the various attachments, the -- and decide whether or not they fall into whatever particular test they decide to apply. Is it going to be Heller and Bruen as the

plaintiffs understand Heller and Bruen? Is it going to be Friedman and Bevis? I mean, this is -- does he pronounce it Bevis or "Bevis"? I've heard it pronounced both ways.

MR. WELLS: I believe it's "Bevis," Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So, but we've had substantial delays in trying to get this case resolved on the initial pleadings and those have not succeeded. My job as a trial judge is to get this case moving and get the factual issues developed, resolved, and then the -- this isn't going to be the last place where this case is going to be reviewed. But this is going to be a place where a record is fully developed and then the Courts of review, Seventh Circuit, Supreme Court, can make their decision, where I got it wrong, where I got it right.

And so Plaintiffs, you guys have been appellate lawyers. You're about to become trial lawyers. How am I going to try this case; who are we going to -- what experts am I going to offer, if any; how am I going to prove what firearms are commonly held or in common use; how am I going to prove the technical capabilities of these particular firearms? You guys are going to decide what you're fighting over.

For instance, I don't know if anybody is particularly worked up at the state of Illinois says you can't have a grenade launcher. I don't know if that's going to be disputed. But we are going to start dealing with those sort of things now.

MR. WELLS: Your Honor --

THE COURT: When I set aside time for that hearing, one of the things that we want to talk about is, all right, here's how many witnesses we anticipate calling, whether they're going to be live, whether we have an evidence deposition, whether we have certain documents that we've all stipulated to can be admitted to prove or support different things. There's nothing to prevent you to do that and you're going to be required to meet and probably meet on multiple occasions to try to work this thing through and figure out how you're going to present your case. The parties do not agree on the law or the facts in this case.

For the Second Amendment claims, this is not a pure question of law. There are questions of fact that have been sent back to me by the Seventh Circuit. And so if you're not a trial lawyer, talk to trial lawyers in your firm and say, how would you try this case, how would you present it?

And by the way, this is not -- this is not something we're going to take three years to conduct discovery. This case is going to be presented very promptly. Nobody's going to miss a summer vacation working on this. It's going to be done before that. So you need to think about it. I'm hearing a lot of resistance, but start putting together your case.

Barnett, who wants to be -- so let's just -- let

me just put it this way. You guys are going to figure out what witnesses you're going to call. You're going to make those witnesses available for deposition if the other side wants a deposition. That's going to be done promptly. The plaintiffs' lawyers are going to work out amongst themselves what lawyer is going to examine the witness or conduct the examination or the cross-examination on behalf of the plaintiffs. We're not going to have -- we're not going to have 16 different lawyers asking the same questions. I do understand that there are some variations for some of the parties, and under those circumstances, counsel will be allowed to inquire of the witness about factual issues that may not be relevant to one of the other party plaintiffs. So you're going to work that out and we're going to pull this all together.

Assault weapons is not a scientific term. It's more of a political term. And it varies from who you talk to, and it varies how it's defined. I'm going to look at each and every one of these guns, each and every one of these attachments that the parties are saying violates the -- banning them violates their rights, and we're going to analyze each of them. We're going to analyze each of them with respect to whether they are truly reserved for military use. If civilian --

Somebody's dying to talk, but they ought to be dying to listen.

We're going to look at each of these things.

We're going to study each of these things. And I'll make an independent judgment with respect to the -- these items, these arms, and then having analyzed their capabilities, their design, their uses, then plug in the tests that are or may be applicable.

As I sit here, I anticipate saying that this test, Test A is articulated in this case and that case. Test B is articulated in a different case. Under both tests, I will analyze these cases. I understand that the parties see things widely differently on the law. But there is a lot of things in -- there's a lot of ways I think that Supreme Court cases and Friedman and Bevis can be harmonized for purposes of this proceeding.

The Supreme Court can always take cert, but until then, we are now at the trial phase of -- or the evidentiary phase of this hearing. It's not a jury trial. This is a request for declaratory judgment. And so I'm going to declare one way or the other what the judgment of this case is based upon the facts. So I'm going to keep a short leash on this.

How long do the plaintiffs' lawyers need to confer amongst themselves and then with Mr. Wells?

MR. ROWEN: This is Matthew Rowen, Your Honor, for the Barnett plaintiffs. I think among the plaintiffs' lawyers, we'd need, you know, at least a week. You can't hear me. We need at least a week among the plaintiffs' lawyers. You

know, we have tried a similar case and so, you know, we have some experience in terms of witnesses and how all that goes.

That was a large capacity magazine case in Oregon where it was six trial days.

THE COURT: Okay. How long did it take -- how long did it take to try that case?

MR. ROWEN: It was six trial days, and before then, there were I believe a dozen depositions, and that was just on magazines. And, you know, here we're adding the overlay of a thousand different models of firearms. So, you know, I think it's going to take some time to get the level of granularity that is arguably required by what the Seventh Circuit decided. But, you know, we will discuss amongst plaintiffs' counsel, and then we will put forward a plan that we can, you know, meet and confer with Mr. Wells and the state and the other defendants.

THE COURT: Any other plaintiffs' counsel want to be heard?

MR. T. MAAG: Thomas Maag. I think a week to discuss amongst plaintiffs' counsel is entirely reasonable. I think that we'd probably ought to be required to at least initiate written discovery in the meantime in the interest of getting this case moving. Whether or not we have agreement with the defendants on the exact parameters, we're going to have to engage in written discovery anyway.

MR. WELLS: Your Honor, if I could be heard 1 2 briefly on that discovery discussion. 3 THE COURT: Can't tell who's talking. MR. WELLS: I'm sorry. It's Mr. Wells. 4 sorry, Your Honor. So I would again just reiterate, we need 5 Rule 26(a) disclosures to know --6 7 THE COURT: All right. 8 MR. WELLS: Your Honor said --9 THE COURT: How many days do you need to make 10 your Rule 26 disclosures? 11 MR. WELLS: That's plaintiffs' question at this point, because as I said, the record at this point -- it's 12 theirs to develop. 13 MR. ROWEN: Yes, Your Honor --14 15 MR. T. MAAG: Thomas Maag for the Langley 16 plaintiffs. I can have my Rule 26 disclosures out in ten days or less. 17 THE COURT: All right. So I'm going to direct 18 19 that the plaintiffs' attorneys meet and confer and to come to 20 grips with the fact that there is going -- that this case is 21 going to proceed to a hearing in which contested questions of 22 fact are going to be addressed, and that the record you develop will be considered a, quote, fully developed record, what do you 23 24 need to prove your case. 25 I'm going to give the -- today is Friday.

lawyers are to confer between now and a week from this Monday, then have an additional seven days to confer with the defendants.

I'm going to set this for another status hearing in two and a half weeks. We're going to revisit this. And you guys are -- I invite you to come up with something that you think you can live with and that works. But this is -- this is not going to be a long, drawn-out process. The hearing itself might take several days to put -- to set aside.

But I anticipate, based upon the record that we have, which is quite extensive, that there's going to be some experts that come in and testify. There's going to be maybe some storeowners that come in and testify about the sales of firearms in Illinois and what they experience, what there's a market for in Illinois, what they were selling prior to this. And there may be some documents that you guys stipulate to with respect to the specific capabilities of each banned firearm. And, you know, you can get -- I would suspect that the manufacturers would cooperate with the plaintiffs' lawyers. Here's what our -- you know, here's what the owner's manual says, here's what the specifications are, we know what the military reserves for itself, we know what MIL-SPEC means. And so we're going to take a look at those things.

But this is going to be on an expedited docket.

We're going to expedite this, because we owe it -- we owe it to

everybody involved to get, at least at the District Court level, since the Seventh Circuit has said this is a case that cannot be resolved, cannot be resolved by preliminary injunctive relief, it has to go to declaratory judgment. It cannot be resolved in a preliminary judgment decision.

And I'm instructed to develop the record further. I know I sound like a broken record. But it's important that you guys understand what you're going to be dealing with. There are a lot of very fine lawyers in this case and a lot of lawyers who have litigated these cases all over the country, lawyers who have argued these cases before federal circuit courts, before the United States Supreme Court.

It's not -- I have been studying this. I have gone through all the stuff that you guys have submitted. I don't think that the -- an evidentiary hearing as part of the presentation for a request for declaratory judgment is going to be that particularly complicated. I don't think the discovery is going to take a tremendously long period of time. The government -- the government has its position on why it ruled or why it legislated the way it did. The plaintiffs disagree with it and believe that under existing case law, the facts are that some or all of these guns and attachments cannot be banned. They are protected by the Second Amendment.

I know, Mr. Maag, you have a Fifth Amendment argument. That's actually I think a pure question of law. I

don't anticipate there -- I mean, that's something that can 1 2 probably be addressed in summary judgment. But on these other ones, it's contested fact. 3 So let's pick a date for the next status 4 Jackie, let's look at what -conference. 5 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: In two and a half weeks, 6 7 you're in trial, so. 8 THE COURT: If I'm in trial, I can walk and chew 9 gum at the same time. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Your three-week criminal 10 11 trial. 12 THE COURT: We'll do the same thing. We're going to set it for a status conference on Friday. 13 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: That's the 2nd. 14 the first Friday. 15 THE COURT: We'll work with that too. 16 That's February -- three weeks from now is February the 2nd? 17 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Mm-hmm. 18 19 THE COURT: Three Fridays from now? 20 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Mm-hmm. 21 THE COURT: All right. We're going to set it at 22 Is that a date that you or -- and I should say, and none 1:30. of the lawyers in your firm would be available? None of the 23 24 lawyers in your office would be available? 25 David Sigale, Your Honor. MR. SIGALE:

February 2nd at 1:30 is fine. 1 2 THE COURT: Mr. Wells? Works for us, Your Honor. 3 MR. WELLS: THE COURT: All right. 4 5 MR. T. MAAG: Thomas Maag. That's fine. 6 THE COURT: Anybody else want to be heard? 7 So between now and February the 2nd, you guys 8 can -- you can agree that we're going to do witness disclosures, 9 preliminary rule disclosures, share it with the other side, and 10 you can even start talking about depositions. The -- one thing 11 I think we've learned today is that the fact that you guys might agree to a particular schedule doesn't mean that I'm going to go 12 along with it and this case is being expedited. 13 Anything else for any of the 14 All right. plaintiffs? 15 16 MR. SIGALE: David Sigale, Your Honor. No. Thank you, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Wells, anything else on behalf of 18 19 the state parties? 20 MR. WELLS: Just in terms of the scope of the 21 claims, Your Honor, I think we agree with your view on the Fifth 22 Amendment question, and we'll be filing our response on the 19th. There is the unresolved question of the Langley vagueness 23 24 We think the Court's rulings in December are strongly 25 indicative that it's a question of law and that those claims

should also be dismissed. So we --

THE COURT: Are you talking about vagueness?

MR. WELLS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WELLS: So we will confer as a team, but I think one of the ways in which we think this could be expedited is to again streamline and focus on the Second Amendment claims as opposed to the additional claims that are in the Langley case. And just wanted to note that for the Court's benefit so that we can again focus on where we think the commonality here is to move expeditiously.

THE COURT: Yeah, I don't -- I don't think -- I don't think anyone has raised -- has anyone raised a vagueness claim on the basis of, as applied to them, with respect to like the registration?

MR. WELLS: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor. It's Mr. Wells.

THE COURT: As I said in my order, the -- it doesn't suffer from a lack of clarity of what they're trying to accomplish. We understand what the core of this -- what the statute is and we understand what's at the core of the registration requirements. It's people who have these firearms who owned them prior to the date of the enactment have to register the firearms going forward so that if they are found with them, the government is alerted that, yes, you proved that

you owned these before the statute was put in place, and you are allowed to possess them. So we understand those things.

What this is -- the focus of what I think that the factual disputes are going to be is the guns, the nature of the right, the specifics, and whether they fall inside or outside Bevis's -- whether they constitute an arm under Bevis and Friedman or whether they do not. And if they constitute an arm, what's their principal application, is the principal application military, if they are arms, are they commonly held for any lawful purpose.

I know that Bevis spent most of his time talking about self-defense in the home, but of course the Second Amendment clearly allows for the right to extend beyond -- beyond the interior of their home, beyond their yard, that you're entitled to defend yourself in public. The Supreme Court has also said that the Second Amendment applies for any lawful use, not just self-defense. But at the core, obviously, it's concepts of self-defense and that's why it's such an important and fundamental right.

So any of the plaintiffs' lawyers, are there as-applied challenges in your pleadings that would be taken up differently than a simple analysis of the firearms and the attachments themselves?

MR. MICHEL: Chuck Michel, Your Honor. I believe we said in our motion papers in our complaint that we were

making an as-applied challenge, that it was not perfected at the time of our motion. I don't want to really -- I don't want to waive that, but I also don't want to get bogged down in that for the purposes of this evidentiary hearing. I think we're better off focusing --

THE COURT: No, that's a great point. And I think that's some of the things that I want the plaintiffs' lawyers to talk about. That's some of the things that we want the defense lawyers to talk with the plaintiffs' lawyers about. And as long as we are -- as long as we're moving forward towards developing a full record with respect to these firearms, I'm happy with that. There might be some -- there might be some unique wrinkles that the parties might agree that they -- they live to fight another day on that one, and there are some things that are raised in the pleadings that even if the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, that those claims may not be addressed by the Supreme Court on certiorari.

So any other plaintiffs want to be heard on that?

All right. Thank you. Think about your case, think how long it will take you to present it, think about the way it can be expedited. You know who the experts are.

Mr. Wells, you took depositions of -- or people on your staff took depositions of certain witnesses who offered affidavits with respect to the vagueness claims. You know, I don't know how much of that's redundant. But if you put your

heads together, I think you'll find you guys can make a very effective presentation on behalf of your clients' interests, even in a case on an expedited docket. All right. Anything else? All right. Enjoy We are adjourned. your weekend. (Proceedings concluded at 2:20 p.m.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. Dated this 13th day of January, 2024 /s/ Hannah Jagler Hannah Jagler, RMR, CRR, FCRR Official Court Reporter